Mackie’s Evil and Omnipotence is concerned with the existential problem of evil and how it is logically incompatible for an omnipotent and wholly good God to allow evil to exist. Pike on the other hand, in his Hume on Evil, successfully demonstrates that Mackie’s conclusion is without certainty. Mackie, whose argument is clearly and logically defined, is ultimately more persuasive than the hypothetical theodicy that Pike has proposed.
Mackie, which is of the notion that biblical theism does not exist, attempts to demonstrate a logical incompatibility within these three claims: (1)God is omnipotent; (2)God is wholly good; (3)Evil exists. However the contradiction in (1)-(3) is not self evident without first clarifying what each means. Mackie explains that (1) and (2) respectively mean: (1’)There are no limits to what an omnipotent being can do; (2’)Good is opposed to evil, in such a way that a good thing always eliminates evil as far as it can. From (1’) and (2’) it follows that “a good omnipotent thing eliminates evil completely, and then the propositions that a good omnipotent thing exists, and that evil exists are incompatible,” (Mackie 26). That is to say, that an omnipotent wholly good God would not allow evil to exist. Since the existence of evil is an empirical claim, Mackie can also say that future actions or observations do not change any conclusions drawn from (1)-(3). Mackie does however concede that two out of his three claims (1)-(3) can be true, but never all three.
Mackie’s concession allows him to explain what an adequate solution might be for the problem of evil. Mackie says one could deny that (1)God is omnipotent. If God is not omnipotent then perhaps he could not eliminate all evil. So then the solution could follow: (~1)God is not omnipotent; (2)God is wholly good; (3)Evil exists. However if (1) is not denied then the next adequate solution would be to deny that (2)God is wholly good. If God is not wholly good then the solution would follow as: (1)God is omnipotent; (~2)God is not wholly good; (3)Evil exists. Mackie suggests that the denial of (1) or (2) would change common held beliefs about God. Hence, traditional theistic claims about God’s attributes, namely (1) and (2) or (1’) and (2’), are not both true. The final solution Mackie proposes is the denial of God entirely. If God does not exist then the problem of evil disappears. This solution can be construed as: (~4)God does not exist; (3)Evil exists. Mackie concludes his ‘Adequate Solutions’ by chastising those theologians who indirectly accept one these solutions, only to delay admitting that there is a logical incompatibility between claims about God.
Mackie believes that any other solutions to the problem of evil must be fallacious. Mackie expounds on this belief by systematically explaining the flaw in many commonly held theodicies. The first theodicy Mackie examines is the notion that ‘good cannot exist without evil’, or rather that “evil is the necessary counterpart of good.” Mackie counters by questioning if good and evil necessitate one another, because an omnipotent God could create a world without evil. Therefore, the argument that good and evil require each other is a fallacious defensive theodicy.
The next theodicy that Mackie challenges is the idea that “the universe is better with some evil in it than it could be if there were no evil.” This argument entails that there be two kinds of goods: good1 and a good2 (benevolence), which augments good1. However good2 logically requires that an evil1 exists. So, good2 aims to minimize evil1 and promote good1. Since God is good, one can suppose that God wishes to promote good2 and hence allows evil1 to exist. Mackie refers to God’s will to maximize good2 as ‘good3’. The first objection that Mackie raises is that since good2 is only a means to good1, it is logically compatible to have good1 without good2 and therefore there is no need to posit evil1 at all. Next Mackie notes that saying God does not directly minimize evil1, but merely promotes good2, is contrary to what theists want to say about God. The final objection Mackie has is the clear existence of an evil2: malevolence, cruelty, etc. Evil2 decreases good1 and increases evil1, but the problem of evil2 is not explained in this theodicy. Mackie notes that one might argue for the existence of evil2 so that a good3 exists, which maximizes good2 and minimizes evil2. However since good3 logically requires an evil2 one can say there is an evil3, the will to maximize evil2 and minimize good3. Ultimately this theodicy boils down to an infinite regress and fails.
The notion that “evil is due to human freewill” is the next theodicy that Mackie tackles. Similarly, this theodicy also posits that good1 is augmented by good2 which logically requires an evil1. However this theodicy also posits an evil2, which only exists because of the freewill of human acts. God allows evil2 to exist because freewill is good3, or the best good. The apparent assumption here is that evil2 is logically required for the freedom of the will. Mackie questions this assumption by explaining that it is not clear why evil2 would be logically required for freedom of the will. So Mackie’s objection is that God could have made humans always choose the good. The theodicy counters by suggesting that “making wrong choices is logically necessary for freedom of the will.” Mackie’s retort explains that the theodicy’s assumption is still not evident because God could make humans will the good at all times. “However, if freedom means randomness then how can it be characteristic of the will?” Mackie calls into question why a ‘random will’ is the most important good(3) . Also, if God cannot control an evil human will, then (~1)God is not omnipotent. Secondly, if God can control freely evil human wills but does not, then it must follow that (~2)God is not wholly good. Mackie supports his conclusions with what he identifies as the paradox of omnipotence. “Can an omnipotent being make things which he cannot subsequently control? Or, what is practically equivalent to this: can an omnipotent being make rules which then bind him?” If ‘yes’, then God is no longer omnipotent after he creates such a thing. If ‘no’, then one must that there are some things God cannot do. In both cases it is evident that (~1)God is not omnipotent. What this demonstrates “is that we cannot consistently ascribe to any continuing being omnipotence in an inclusive sense,” (Mackie 36). The conclusion that Mackie draws from this is that God’s omnipotence must be restricted in one way or another, and that unqualified omnipotence cannot be ascribed to any being that continues through time. Hence, Mackie believes (~1) is true, and now the logical incompatibility of human freewill goes away at the cost, for the theist, of (~1).
In Mackie’s opinion, it is proven with certainty that theists cannot uphold (1)-(3) and (1’)-(2’). Mackie is in an advantageous position with his argument because it places the burden of defense on the theist and therefore it is up to theist philosophers like Nelson Pike to demonstrate that Mackie’s conclusion is in fact illogical. Pike, with the help of David Hume, does this by arguing that if interpreted in a certain way, (1)-(3) are not logically incompatible.
Pike’s purpose is to give a successful defensive theodicy against Mackie’s conclusion of the logical incompatibility in the attributes claimed about God. Pike proposes a case in which a person does or allows evil or suffering to happen so that a good happens. For example, a doctor may amputate a man’s leg in order to save the man’s life. The doctor causes or allows his patient discomfort, however when interpreted within the context of the circumstances then no moral blame should be ascribed to the doctor. By taking this sample moral situation into account, Pike denies Mackie’s claim that a perfectly good God would fail to prevent any and all evils from happening (contra Mackie’s interpretation of (2) as (2’)). “Thus, it does not follow from the claim that God is perfectly good that he would prevent suffering in the world if he could, God might fail to prevent suffering, or himself bring about suffering while remaining perfectly good. It is only required that there be a morally sufficient reason for the action,” (Pike 41). Now that Pike has hypothesized the possibility of a morally sufficient reason one can better formulate Mackie’s (1)-(3) into (4)-(6): (4)The world contains instances of suffering; (5)God exists, and is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly; (6)An omnipotent and omniscient being would have no morally sufficient reason for allowing instances of suffering. Just like (1)-(3), so too with (4)-(6), it seems only two out of three claims are logically compatible with one another.
As a theist Pike cannot deny (4) or (5) and questions whether (6) is a necessary truth. For something to be a necessary truth of something else it must be true at all times (or every possible scenario). Therefore Pike need only find one example where (6) is not a necessary truth to prove (6) false and therefore (1)-(3) not logically incompatible. Pike begins by giving some examples that illustrate what a morally sufficient reason might be. For instance, if one lacks the knowledge or power to prevent evil. Another morally sufficient reason might that ‘one has the knowledge and power to prevent evil, but allows it for a future good’. If any example holds true, then there is a morally sufficient reason for God to allow evil. However, if a theist argues from the latter morally sufficient cause he is caught denying that (2) God is wholly good. Pike notes that all the morally sufficient reasons he can provide entail some sort of defect o shortcoming and it would seem contrary for a theist to posit God with any defect. So, if no morally sufficient reason exists for God to allow evil, then perhaps there is no morally sufficient reason for God to allow evil; therefore, it seems that (6) is a necessary truth.
At this point it is not sure whether (6) is a necessary truth and in order to disprove Mackie, Pike must find one instance when (6) is not true. Pike finds such an instance in Demea’s Theodicy which consists of (7)-(9): (7)Instances of evil are logically required in the best possible world; (8)Assume God exists; (9)Therefore, if God creates the best possible world, then of necessity God allows instances of evil. Pike agrees with Mackie in that (7) is inconclusive because it is not known whether an instance of evil are required for the best possible world. Mackie tried to show that evil should not be thought of as a necessary requirement for good, however Pike gives an example that indicates otherwise. Suppose that Joe is in pain, and this causes empathy (good) in Ashley. Ashley is unhappy (in pain) as a result of Joe being in pain. It is better for Ashley to be in pain and empathetic than that she be indifferent to Joe’s pain (Pike 48). Thus there is some reason to think (7) is might be true. Regardless, Pike only wanted to show that “it is, I submit, far from clear that God and evil could not exist in the same universe,” (Pike 48). Hence, it is still an open question whether God and evil can exist together. The key to this argument, as Pike sees it, is (8) which is also the basis of the successful theodicy shown in Philo’s Second Position.
Up until Demea’s Theodicy it seemed the case that (2) from (1)-(3) was false, and thus the only explanation for the problem of evil. By supposing God exists, either through an a priori proof or by faith, Philo’s Second Position (10)-(12) can now be formulated: (10)God exists and is omnipotent, omniscient and good; (11)Evil and suffering exist; (12)Therefore, God must have some morally sufficient reason to allow suffering and evil to exist. Thus, (6) is false and not a necessary truth.
So, when the existence of God is taken as axiomatic, the problem of evil is reduced to proposing what God’s particular morally sufficient reason(s) would be for allowing evil and suffering. All that matters is that there exists at least one morally sufficient reason, regardless of whether or not anyone actually knows what the morally sufficient reason is. In fact, it does not matter that Pike finds God’s morally sufficient reason because it was demonstrated that it is logically possible that God has one. Since it is logically possible for God to have a morally sufficient reason, then it follows that (10)-(12) is a logically valid theodicy.
The key feature of the theodicy proposed in Philo’s Second Position is (10), because without it the rational falls apart. If one does assume that that (10)God exists and is omniscient, omnipotent and good, then by the empirically data it could be concluded that God does not exist. It is important to notice that this probabilistic argument makes an inference from the empirical data to a conclusion. An inference is only as good as the data one has and any data one might have. So without positing (10) it does not seem possible to give a successful defensive theodicy against Mackie.
Mackie’s conclusions about the nature of God and the problem of evil are not with full certainty, as Pike has successfully demonstrated, however Mackie’s argument ultimately provides a more compelling and persuasive position. In order for Pike to prove an omnipotent and wholly good God is logically compatible with evil he simply posits that both do indeed exist together. Pike is seemingly assuming what he is trying to prove however he is not trying to prove that both God can allow evil to exist, but rather that it is not logically incompatible for God and evil to exist. Pike’s theodicy is grounded hypothetically such that (1)-(3) in fact do exist and therefore cannot be logically incompatible with another. While Mackie makes no such assumptions and simply uses his ration to make conclusions about (1)-(3) regardless of whether or not they are true.

i refuse to read this.

Yeah I'm considering just uploading the word file somewhere, it's hard to read when my notation for different posits aren't compatible on this site.

Would you like us to proofread while we go through it?

If you don't mind... I wrote it in a night on adderall so I'm sure there's lots of grammatical errors.

Hi.