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Look what I learned from my textbook
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XCRobin wrote
at 9:11 AM, Sunday August 17, 2008 EDT
"You can think about a one shot game without worrying about its repercussions on other games you might play in the future...Therefore actions in one-shot games are more likely to be unscrupulous or ruthless...Games with ongoing relationships require the opposite considerations. You have an opportunity to build a reputation (for toughness, fairness, honesty, reliability, and so forth, depending on the circumstances) and to find out more about your opponent. The players together can better exploit mutually beneficial prospects by arranging to divide the spoils over time (taking turns to 'win', or to punish a cheater in future plays)..."
-Dixit and Skeath. Games of Strategy: 2nd Edition. W. W. Norton & Company, New York. 2004. |
Replies 1 - 8 of 8
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Shevar wrote
at 9:29 AM, Sunday August 17, 2008 EDT it's written in a book so it must apply to kdice 100%ly
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XCBatman wrote
at 3:12 PM, Tuesday September 30, 2008 EDT If a game is played repeatedly between two players, or even among the same small group of known players, then any pair is likely to play each other repeatedly. In such a situation, the whole repeated game becomes a game in its own right. It can have very different Nash equilibria from those that simply repeat the Nash equilibrium of a single play. For example, tacit cooperation may emerge in repeated prisoners' dillemmas, owing to the expectation that any temporary gain from cheating will be more than offset by the subsequent loss of trust. If games are repeated in this way, then learning about them must come from playing whole sets of the repetitions frequently, against different partners each time.
-Dixit and Skeath. Games of Strategy: 2nd Edition. W. W. Norton & Company, New York. 2004. |
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bcmatteagles wrote
at 6:15 AM, Wednesday October 1, 2008 EDT Just watch a beautiful mind, if everyone goes for the blonde, they all fail, if everyone goes for the not quite as hot brunettes they all get laid. = Nash Equilibria?!
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kam|k2 wrote
at 1:38 PM, Wednesday October 1, 2008 EDT Therefore one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the most skillful. Seizing the enemy without fighting is the most skillful.
-Sunzi You should read that book, it got a solution for every strategic wargame. mfg me |
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kam|k2 wrote
at 1:39 PM, Wednesday October 1, 2008 EDT oh, i meant the book "art of war", written by sunzi.
br |
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XCBatman wrote
at 3:49 PM, Wednesday October 1, 2008 EDT MattEagles, the first thing we learned in that class was that the movie is wrong. What they explain isn't actually a Nash equilibrium. I have the notes to prove it.
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ChristianSoldier wrote
at 3:56 AM, Thursday October 2, 2008 EDT Nash equilibrium is when none of the agents in the system can change his strategy individually and expect to improve his outcome.
So it doesn't specifically resolve the problem of 'if they all go after the blonde' since it doesn't actually pick which one should be the lucky dude. |
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ChristianSoldier wrote
at 3:56 AM, Thursday October 2, 2008 EDT And by lucky, I mean after marriage, of course.
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